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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 This case raises important questions regarding the 
extent to which the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment may serve to protect landowners against arbitrary 
governmental regulation of land use.  We conclude that in the 
  
context of land use regulation, a property owner states a 
substantive due process claim where he or she alleges that the 
decision limiting the intended land use was arbitrarily or 
irrationally reached.  Here, the plaintiff, Alfred DeBlasio, did 
so allege; however, the district court determined on summary 
judgment that he had failed to present sufficient evidence that 
the governmental decision in question was arbitrary or 
irrational.  We conclude that DeBlasio has presented sufficient 
evidence to survive summary judgment in connection with his 
substantive due process claim. 
 Appellant Alfred DeBlasio brought suit against the 
Zoning Board of Adjustment for the Township of West Amwell 
("ZBA"), its individual members, Eugene Venettone, the Building 
and Zoning Official for the Township of West Amwell, the ZBA 
attorney, and James and Virginia Lavan, Alfred DeBlasio's 
neighbors, claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) 
and the commerce clause, as well as tortious interference with 
contractual relations and prospective economic advantage under 
New Jersey common law.  This is an appeal from the district 
court's granting of the defendants' motion for summary judgment.  
DeBlasio also appeals the district court's denial of his motion 
for leave to file a second amended complaint, and the district 
court's affirmance of the order of the magistrate judge 
prohibiting DeBlasio from questioning the members of the ZBA 
concerning the mental processes used by each to rule on 
DeBlasio's variance application. 
  
 We will affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment with respect to DeBlasio's section 1983 procedural due 
process and unlawful taking claims, as well as DeBlasio's claims 
under section 1985(3) and the commerce clause.  We will also 
affirm the district court's denial of DeBlasio's motion for leave 
to file a second amended complaint, as well as the district 
court's affirmance of the magistrate judge's discovery order.  
Finally, we will affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the Lavans.  However, we will reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to 
DeBlasio's section 1983 substantive due process claim and state 
law tort claims against the ZBA defendants. 
 I. 
 DeBlasio owns property in West Amwell Township, New 
Jersey, upon which a Quonset hut had been constructed.1  Previous 
owners had used the property, and the Quonset hut, as the site of 
an auto body repair business. 
 In the mid-1960s West Amwell enacted a zoning 
ordinance, pursuant to which the future DeBlasio property was 
designated R-3, which signifies 3-acre minimum residential use.  
Since the property was, at that time, being used as the site of 
an auto body repair business, it was not in compliance with the 
newly-enacted zoning restrictions.  Its owners were permitted to 
continue their auto body repair business, however, because the 
                     
1
. A Quonset hut is a semicylindrical metal shelter with end 
walls, usually serving as a barracks or storage shed.  See The 
Random House College Dictionary 1086 (Rev. Ed. 1982). 
  
property received an exemption as a pre-existing nonconforming 
use, specifically an auto body repair shop. 
 In 1967 a neighbor filed a complaint with the ZBA 
challenging the existence of the auto body repair shop, alleging 
that the pre-existing nonconforming use had been abandoned or 
unlawfully expanded.  The ZBA conducted a hearing and determined 
that the use had been properly maintained. 
 DeBlasio purchased the property in 1974.  In 1979, he 
leased the property to Interstate Battery Systems, a small, 
battery distribution business run by Peter Holmes.  Holmes' 
business grew considerably over the next ten years.  By the end 
of the 1980s, Holmes employed six full-time workers and two 
part-time workers.  The business used five tractor-trailer trucks 
and distributed 30,000 batteries a year, many more than the 2,000 
batteries Holmes distributed in 1979. 
 To understand the issues this appeal presents, we must 
add to this background information some additional facts 
concerning the Secretary of the ZBA, Werner Hoff, and his 
children. 
 Werner Hoff's son, John Hoff, also owned property in 
West Amwell which included a Quonset hut.  John Hoff had used 
this property as the site of an excavation business. 
 Toward the end of 1988, John Hoff's business was 
failing.  Werner Hoff believed that if John Hoff could secure 
some additional funds, he would be able to conduct an orderly and 
profitable liquidation of his assets.  Consequently, in early 
1989, Werner Hoff and his older son, Werner Hoff, Jr., loaned the 
  
younger Hoff a sum of money.  In exchange, Werner Hoff and Werner 
Hoff, Jr. received a mortgage on John Hoff's property.  Werner 
Hoff, Jr.'s investment company, W.E.H. Realty III, paid the 
monthly maintenance expenses on the property.  Werner Hoff, Sr. 
acted as Werner Hoff, Jr.'s business agent and handled the day to 
day management tasks associated with the property. 
 At some point after 1989, Werner Hoff, Jr. decided to 
purchase John Hoff's property.  According to Werner Hoff, Sr.'s 
affidavit, Werner Hoff, Jr. agreed to assume John Hoff's debts, 
and to take "de facto control" of the property.  Although it is 
not clear when this "de facto control" occurred, it is clear from 
the record that the actual sale of the property to Werner Hoff, 
Jr. took place in December of 1991. 
 Toward the end of 1988, when John Hoff's business was 
experiencing financial difficulties, Werner Hoff, Sr. had a 
brief, unscheduled encounter with Peter Holmes.  According to 
Holmes' affidavit, in the course of this conversation, 
 Mr. Hoff told me that I should consider 
purchasing or renting his property on 
Route 31 in West Amwell Township. 
 Mr. Hoff stated that he would sell the 
Route 31 property to me for $300,000 or, if I 
did not wish to purchase the property, I 
could rent it from him. 
 
 I told him that the Quonset Hut on that 
property was smaller than the Quonset Hut on 
the DeBlasio property, and was too small for 
my vehicles. 
 
 In response, Mr. Hoff represented that the 
zoning on the Route 31 property was such that 
I could legally park my vehicles outside.  He 
told me that I wouldn't have the problems on 
the Route 31 property that I was having on 
  
the DeBlasio property.  This was a clear 
reference to the complaints that the township 
officials had been receiving from the Lavans, 
who lived across Rock Road from the DeBlasio 
property. 
(Appendix at 249-50).  Holmes did not pursue Hoff's offer, and 
Hoff did not discuss the subject with Holmes at any time in the 
future. 
 In February of 1989, Virginia Lavan, who owned property 
near the DeBlasio property, filed a "citizen's complaint" 
regarding Interstate Battery.  Eugene Venettone, the West Amwell 
Township zoning official, inspected the property and concluded 
that the Interstate battery operation constituted an expansion of 
the pre-existing nonconforming use and that the operation was, 
therefore, in violation of the West Amwell zoning ordinance.  
  In March, 1990, DeBlasio and Interstate Battery 
applied to the ZBA for an interpretation of the status of 
DeBlasio's property.  They also requested a variance, in the 
event the ZBA decided that Holmes could not continue operating 
his business without one. 
 In June, 1990, the ZBA took up the DeBlasio/Interstate 
petition, among other matters.  Secretary Hoff attended the 
meeting and recorded the minutes.  However, when the DeBlasio 
matter came before the ZBA, Mr. Hoff announced that he would not 
participate in the ZBA's decision.  The ZBA proceeded to find 
that in issuing the February 1989 citation, Venettone had not 
adequately identified the particular provision of the zoning 
ordinance that Interstate had purportedly violated.  
  
Consequently, the ZBA decided, it could not "make a 
determination" regarding the violation.  (Appendix at 85).  
DeBlasio and Interstate then withdrew their request for a 
variance.  
 In August of 1990, zoning official Venettone issued a 
new citation to Holmes.  The citation listed "Expansion of the 
pre-existing, non-conforming use . . ." as the zoning violation.2  
DeBlasio and Interstate filed another notice of appeal of 
Venettone's decision with the ZBA.  They also requested that if 
their appeal were to fail, the ZBA consider their submission as a 
request for a variance. 
 The ZBA heard the appeal in September of 1990.  
Secretary Hoff participated in these proceedings, having 
                     
2
. According to DeBlasio, Hoff spoke privately with Venettone 
some time between June 26 and August 7, 1990, and pressed 
Venettone to issue the second notice of violation.  In his brief, 
DeBlasio cites to a portion of Venettone's deposition in support 
of this contention, where Venettone describes a phone 
conversation he had with Werner Hoff.  The testimony reads: 
 
  [Venettone]:  I called him on the phone about 
business, and that's when the Interstate 
Battery thing was being tossed around in the 
papers, and I would, you know, ask him for 
information about it, you know, only in his 
capacity as secretary of the board. 
 
  Q:  Did Mr. Hoff ever push you to issue a 
notice of violation?  When I say "push you," 
did he ever suggest or recommend to you that 
you issue a notice of violation to Interstate 
Battery? 
 
  A:  Yes, that he thought they were in 
violation, as did a lot of people. 
 
(Appendix at 180). 
  
determined that there was no longer an appearance of a conflict 
now that Werner Hoff, Sr.'s son Werner Hoff, Jr. had announced 
his decision to purchase John Hoff's West Amwell property.  The 
ZBA voted unanimously to uphold Venettone's decision that Holmes' 
business operations constituted an unlawful expansion of the 
nonconforming use.  The next month, the ZBA adopted a resolution 
to that effect. 
 The ZBA did not take up DeBlasio's request for a 
variance until the following March.  After holding hearings, the 
ZBA voted against granting the request.  Hoff participated fully 
in these hearings and voted against the variance.  In June, 1991, 
the ZBA adopted a resolution of memorialization denying 
DeBlasio's request for a use variance.  Holmes was given six 
months to relocate. 
 This law suit followed.  DeBlasio's complaint set forth 
four counts:  (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on the 
deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive and 
procedural due process and his Fifth Amendment right not to have 
his property taken without just compensation; (2) violation of 
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (the civil rights conspiracy statute); 
(3) tortious interference with contractual relations and 
prospective economic advantage, under New Jersey common law; and 
(4) violation of the commerce clause. 
 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants.  As to DeBlasio's claims under section 1983, the 
district court held that DeBlasio's allegations of violations of 
procedural due process, substantive due process and unlawful 
  
taking failed to rise to the level of constitutional violations.  
The district court further concluded that DeBlasio failed to 
allege that he was part of any protected class which would bring 
him under the protection of section 1985.  With respect to 
DeBlasio's tort claims under New Jersey common law, the district 
court held that DeBlasio failed to comply with the notice 
provision contained in the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.  Finally, 
with regard to DeBlasio's claims under the commerce clause, the 
district court held that DeBlasio failed to establish any 
evidence of a burden on interstate commerce. 
 II. 
 Subject matter jurisdiction in the district court was 
predicated on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and 1367.  We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Since this 
is an appeal from a district court's granting of summary 
judgment, we exercise plenary review.  Equimark Commercial Fin. 
Co. v. C.I.T. Fin. Servs. Corp., 812 F.2d 141, 142 (3d Cir. 
1987). 
 III. 
 We have fully considered the issues raised in 
connection with the district court's dismissal of DeBlasio's 
taking of property without just compensation claim, his section 
1985(3) claim, his claim under the commerce clause, as well as 
his claims that the district court erred in affirming the 
magistrate judge's discovery order and in denying DeBlasio's 
motion for leave to file an amended complaint.  We conclude that 
these issues lack merit and do not require discussion. 
  
 We now address whether the district court properly 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in connection 
with DeBlasio's due process claims.  DeBlasio asserts that the 
defendants' actions violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to 
both procedural and substantive due process.  We will consider 
each of these contentions in turn. 
 A.  Procedural Due Process 
 Relying on our decisions in Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 
1124 (3d Cir. 1988), and Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of 
Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1991), the district court 
concluded that DeBlasio's procedural due process claims failed 
because New Jersey provides a constitutionally adequate process 
for challenging wrongful zoning decisions.  We agree that our 
decisions in Bello and Midnight Sessions defeat DeBlasio's 
procedural due process claims. 
 In order to establish a violation of his right to 
procedural due process, DeBlasio, in addition to proving that a 
person acting under color of state3 law deprived him of a 
protected property interest,4 must establish that the state 
                     
3
. DeBlasio's violation of due process claims do not run afoul 
of the "person acting under color of state law" requirement.  
Clearly, in finding the zoning ordinance violation and in denying 
the application for a variance, the defendants were acting under 
color of state law. 
4
. On occasion, we have refrained from conducting inquiry into 
the question whether the plaintiff was deprived of a protected 
property interest, and have proceeded directly to evaluate the 
nature of the process the plaintiff received.  See e.g., Bello, 
840 F.2d at 1127-28.  Following our example in Bello, among other 
cases, the district court never explicitly considered whether 
DeBlasio had a protected property interest before evaluating the 
sufficiency of the process afforded DeBlasio. 
  
procedure for challenging the deprivation does not satisfy the 
requirements of procedural due process.  Midnight Sessions, Ltd. 
v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 680 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(citation omitted).  As we observed in Bello, a state provides 
constitutionally adequate procedural due process when it provides 
reasonable remedies to rectify a legal error by a local 
administrative body.  Bello, 840 F.2d at 1128 (citations 
omitted).  In other words, when a state "affords a full judicial 
mechanism with which to challenge the administrative decision" in 
question, the state provides adequate procedural due process, 
id., whether or not the plaintiff avails him or herself of the 
provided appeal mechanism.  Midnight Sessions, 945 F.2d at 682. 
 In Bello, a developer sued the Code Enforcement Officer 
of Bethel Park, Pennsylvania, as well as the municipal council 
and the municipality itself, for denying him a building permit.  
Bello alleged that the Code Enforcement Officer denied him a 
building permit as a result of pressure from members of the 
council who were trying to hinder Bello's building project for 
personal and political motives.  We found that sufficient 
evidence supported Bello's allegations to create a genuine issue 
with respect to their truth.  Thus, for reasons we will discuss 
at greater length below, we reversed the district court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Bello's 
substantive due process claim.  However, as for procedural due 
process, we stated: 
 Pennsylvania affords a full judicial 
mechanism with which to challenge the 
administrative decision to deny an 
  
application for a building permit.  Indeed, 
the plaintiffs utilized that mechanism and 
obtained a building permit.  While the 
Pennsylvania courts have ruled that the 
initial decision to deny the permit was 
wrong, the plaintiffs have not and cannot 
show that the decision was made pursuant to a 
constitutionally defective procedure . . . . 
 
  It is the law in this Circuit that a 
state provides adequate due process when it 
provides "reasonable remedies to rectify 
legal error by a local administrative body."  
Pennsylvania clearly provides such remedies, 
as this case exemplifies, and therefore 
plaintiffs have no justifiable [procedural] 
due process claim. 
Bello, 840 F.2d at 1128 (citations omitted). 
 New Jersey provides a full judicial process for 
challenging adverse zoning decisions.  As the district court 
noted, 
 N.J.S.A. § 40:55D-70 (a) and (b) provide that 
the ZBA shall have power to hear and decide 
appeals of the zoning officer's enforcement 
of a zoning ordinance and hear and decide 
requests for an interpretation of a zoning 
ordinance.  Furthermore, pursuant to 
subsections (c) and (d) of this statutory 
section, the ZBA shall have the power to 
grant a request for a variance or other 
relief, so long as the variance or other 
relief can be granted without substantial 
detriment to the public good and will not 
substantially impair the intent and purpose 
of the zone plan and zone ordinance. 
 
  Also, pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 40:55D-72, 
any interested party affected by any decision 
of an administrative officer of the 
municipality based on or made in the 
enforcement of the zoning ordinances or 
official map can appeal to the ZBA. 
 
  Last, pursuant to Rule 4:69-1, et seq. 
of the New Jersey Court Rules, plaintiff is 
entitled to a review, a hearing and relief by 
  
filing a complaint, before the expiration of 
45 days from the time the plaintiff received 
notice that his or her application was 
denied, in the Superior Court, Law Division, 
bearing the designation "In Lieu of 
Prerogative Writs." 
(Appendix 306-07). 
 DeBlasio has not alleged that this procedure is 
inadequate, or that it is anything less than the procedure we 
found constitutionally adequate in Bello.  We conclude that the 
procedures for challenging Venettone's citation as well as the 
ZBA's denial of DeBlasio's variance application are 
constitutionally sufficient.5 
 B.  Substantive Due Process 
 Substantive due process is an area of the law "famous 
for its controversy, and not known for its simplicity."  Schaper 
v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 716 (5th Cir. 1987).  Our 
substantive due process inquiry is rendered even more difficult 
by the paucity of Supreme Court guidance. 
 The district court based it dismissal of DeBlasio's 
substantive due process claim on its conclusion that DeBlasio had 
failed to offer sufficient evidence to support the allegation 
that the ZBA had employed unlawful criteria in denying DeBlasio's 
application for a use variance and in determining that DeBlasio's 
property was in violation of the West Amwell zoning ordinance.   
                     
5
. In Rogin v. Bensalem Tp., 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980), we 
upheld Pennsylvania's scheme for challenging zoning ordinances, 
which scheme provided for a ministerial review of a proposed use 
by a Zoning Officer, appeal to the Zoning Hearing Board, and 
appeal of that decision to the Court of Common Pleas.  Rogin, 616 
F.2d at 694-95.  
  
Before addressing the sufficiency of DeBlasio's evidence of 
improper motive, we must first determine (1) whether a plaintiff 
such as DeBlasio must, as a predicate to a substantive due 
process claim, establish possession of a property interest worthy 
of substantive due process protection; and (2) if so, whether 
DeBlasio possesses a property interest worthy of protection under 
substantive due process.  See Ersek v. Township of Springfield, 
Delaware County, 822 F. Supp. 218, 220 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
 In Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1989), we 
observed that the issue of whether and when state-created 
property interests invoke substantive due process concerns has 
not been decided by the Supreme Court.  Reich, 883 F.2d at 243.  
Without attempting to define the set of state-created property 
interests protected by the concept of substantive due process, we 
concluded in Reich:  "[i]t is apparent . . . that, in this 
circuit at least, not all property interests worthy of procedural 
due process protection are protected by the concept of 
substantive due process."  Id. at 244. 
 In Reich, the plaintiff was hired by Washington County, 
Pennsylvania, to investigate and prosecute the Washington County 
controller.  Reich carried out his assignment and then submitted 
bills for payment to the county.  Id. at 239.  However, to 
receive payment, Reich first had to secure the controller's 
approval, which the controller refused to provide.  Reich sued 
the controller, claiming that she had deprived him of property 
without due process of law in violation of the procedural and 
substantive components of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process 
  
clause.  Id. at 240.  The controller filed a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The 
district court granted the controller's motion.  Id. 
 We affirmed the district court's dismissal of Reich's 
complaint.  We held that Reich had failed to state a substantive 
due process claim.  We relied on Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398 
(3d Cir. 1988), a case in which we held that an entitlement under 
state law to water and sewer services does not constitute a 
protectible property interest for purposes of substantive due 
process.  Id. at 244.  We explained in Reich: 
 We believe it follows a fortiori from the 
holding in Ransom that Reich's complaint 
fails to state a substantive due process 
claim.  As we have noted, the only interest 
that Reich had at stake before Beharry was 
his interest in avoiding delay in the receipt 
of payment of a bill for professional 
services rendered.  We can think of no basis 
for according substantive due process 
protection to this interest while denying it 
to those who have had their utility service 
terminated. 
Id. at 244-45. 
 While we refrained in Reich from defining the set of 
property interests protected by the concept of substantive due 
process, we did suggest that only fundamental property interests 
are worthy of such protection.  We stated that: 
 [i]n Mauriello v. U. of Med. & Dentistry of 
N.J., 781 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1986), this court 
acknowledged that what constitutes a property 
interest in the procedural due process 
context might not constitute one in that of 
substantive due process.  In Mauriello, a 
student [was] dismissed for academic reasons 
from a doctoral program . . . . 
 
  
  In discussing the student's substantive 
due process claim, the Mauriello court 
appeared to approve of Justice Powell's view 
. . . that, while property rights for 
procedural due process purposes are created 
by state law, substantive due process rights 
are created by the Constitution.  The 
Mauriello court also "share[d] Justice 
Powell's doubt about the existence of . . . a 
substantive due process right in the 
circumstances here," noting that the 
student's claim to continued enrollment in a 
graduate program bore "`little resemblance to 
the fundamental interests that previously had 
been viewed as implicitly protected by the 
Constitution.'" 
Reich, 883 F.2d at 244 (quoting Mauriello, 781 F.2d at 50) 
(quoting Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 
(1985) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 Though we have yet to clearly define the category of 
property interests protected by the concept of substantive due 
process, in Bello v. Walker we provided some guidance in the area 
of land use regulation. 
 In Bello, the plaintiffs obtained municipality approval 
for a five stage subdivision building plan.  After obtaining 
building permits for the first stage of the plan, and completing 
the first stage of construction, the municipality's code 
enforcement officer denied the plaintiffs' application for 
building permits to allow the plaintiffs to commence construction 
of the housing units which comprised the fifth stage of the 
project.  The code enforcement officer contended that he denied 
the plaintiffs' building permit application because the 
plaintiffs sought to construct the fifth stage of the project 
  
before completing phases two through four.  Bello, 840 F.2d at 
1126.  The plaintiffs, however, had never agreed to develop the 
project in the order suggested by the numerical sequence of the 
stages.  Id. 
 The plaintiffs ultimately sought redress in the Court 
of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.  After a 
hearing, the court ordered the municipality to issue the building 
permits.  Id.  However, prior to obtaining relief in state court, 
the plaintiffs filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
the municipality and the individual municipal officials in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.  The plaintiffs alleged that a number of the 
defendant officials had improperly influenced the decision to 
deny the plaintiffs' building permit application, in violation, 
inter alia, of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights to due 
process.  Id. at 1127. 
 The defendants moved for summary judgment, presenting 
evidence that the building permit denial had issued solely 
because the plaintiffs sought to undertake the fifth stage before 
developing stages two through four.  In opposition to the motion, 
the plaintiffs presented evidence indicating that certain town 
council members had personal animosity towards one of the 
plaintiffs' employees, and that various defendant members of the 
town council had pressured members of the council to hinder the 
plaintiffs' building project so long as the plaintiffs employed 
this particular employee.  Id.  The district court granted the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
  
 We reversed the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in connection with the plaintiffs' substantive due 
process claims.  We explained in this regard, after canvassing 
the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area, that "the 
deliberate and arbitrary abuse of government power violates an 
individual's right to substantive due process."  Id. at 1129.  We 
found that the plaintiffs presented evidence from which a 
fact-finder could reasonably conclude that certain council 
members "improperly interfered with the process by which the 
municipality issued building permits, and that they did so for 
partisan political or personal reasons unrelated to the merits of 
the application for the permits."  Id. at 1129. 
 These actions can have no relationship to any 
legitimate governmental objective, and if 
proven, are sufficient to establish a 
substantive due process violation actionable 
under section 1983.  While the defendants 
claim that the building permit was denied 
because of plaintiffs' failure to build in 
numerical sequence, thus presenting an 
arguably rational ground for the denial of 
the permit, it is the factfinders' role to 
resolve this factual dispute. 
Id. at 1129-30. 
 In Bello we did not discuss whether the plaintiffs 
possessed a property interest worthy of substantive due process 
protection.6  In subsequent cases we have clarified that to state 
                     
6
. Similarly, in the cases of Pace Resources, Inc. v. 
Shrewsbury Tp., 808 F.2d 1023, 1034-36 (3d Cir. 1987), and 
Neiderhiser v. Borough of Berwick, 840 F.2d 213, 217-18 (3d Cir. 
1988), in the context of land use regulation, we did not identify 
a specific property interest at issue worthy of substantive due 
process before addressing whether the zoning decision in question 
violated substantive due process.  
  
a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must have been 
deprived of a particular quality of property interest.  Our most 
recent restatement of this proposition is found in Acierno v. 
Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 1994).7  There we stated that when 
complaining of a violation of substantive due process rights, a 
plaintiff must prove that the governmental authority "acted to 
`infringe [ ] a property interest encompassed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.'"  Acierno, 40 F.3d at 616 (quoting Midnight Sessions, 
945 F.2d at 679);8 accord Taylor Investment v. Upper Darby 
Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1292 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating, in dicta, 
that to prevail on a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff 
                     
7
. Though one issue in Acierno was considered by the court 
sitting in banc, the substantive due process issue was considered 
by the panel only.  Acierno, 40 F.3d at 600. 
8
. We further explained in Acierno: 
 
  As the Supreme Court has previously stated:  
Property interests, of course, are not 
created by the Constitution.  Rather, they 
are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings 
that stem from an independent source such 
as state law -- rules or understandings 
that secure certain benefits and that 
support claims of entitlement to those 
benefits.  Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
 
   Thus . . . when analyzing substantive 
due process claims courts are required to 
turn to state and local law to determine 
whether the plaintiff possessed a property 
interest which was abrogated by the 
governmental action. 
 
Id. at 616. 
  
"must demonstrate that an arbitrary and capricious act deprived 
them of a protected property interest"). 
 We think it consistent with Bello to conclude that 
ownership is a property interest worthy of substantive due 
process protection.9  See, e.g., Ersek v. Township of 
Springfield, Delaware County, 822 F. Supp. 218, 221 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 
1993) (offering a similar interpretation of Bello).  Indeed, one 
would be hard-pressed to find a property interest more worthy of 
substantive due process protection than ownership.  Thus, in the 
context of land use regulation, that is, in situations where the 
governmental decision in question impinges upon a landowner's use 
and enjoyment of property, a land-owning plaintiff states a 
                     
9
. The dissent does not read Bello as "standing for the 
proposition that mere ownership is a sufficient substantive due 
process property interest."  Dis. Op. Typescript at 5.  Instead, 
the dissent would hold that "legitimate claim[s] of entitlement" 
determine the set of property interests worthy of substantive due 
process.  Our understanding of Bello's impact upon this case 
leads us to a different conclusion. 
 
 First, we note that in Bello, we did not undertake an 
entitlement analysis before finding that the plaintiff's asserted 
substantive due process claim survived summary judgment.  See 
Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1128-1130.  Second, we are less 
certain that the "legitimate claim of entitlement" approach is 
mandated by Supreme Court jurisprudence.  As we have previously 
noted, the Supreme Court has yet to articulate a standard for 
determining which state-created property interests merit 
substantive due process protection.  See Reich v. Beharry, 883 
F.2d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 1989).  As for Board of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564 (1972), a decision the dissent relies upon, we agree 
with the observation of the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit:  in Roth, the Court announced that a property interest 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment "includes not only 
what is owned but also, in some limited circumstances, what is 
sought."  RRI Realty Corp. v. Inc. Village of Southampton, 870 
F.2d 911, 915 (2d Cir. 1989) (emphasis supplied) (citing Roth, 
408 U.S. at 577). 
  
substantive due process claim where he or she alleges that the 
decision limiting the intended land use was arbitrarily or 
irrationally reached.10  Where the plaintiff so alleges, the 
plaintiff has, as a matter of law, impliedly established 
possession of a property interest worthy of substantive due 
process protection.11 
 C.  Sufficiency of Evidence of 
 Substantive Due Process Violation 
 
 We now turn our attention to the question of the 
sufficiency of DeBlasio's evidence of improper motive. 
 As explained above, in Bello, we reversed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs 
                     
10
. In Neiderhiser v. Borough of Berwick, 840 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 
1988), we held that a lessor who had been denied an exemption 
from a zoning ordinance stated a substantive due process claim by 
alleging that the exemption application was arbitrarily and 
irrationally denied.  See Neiderhiser, 849 F.2d at 218 (citing 
Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124 (3d Cir. 1988).  Having implied in 
Neiderhiser that a lessor possesses a property interest worthy of 
substantive due process protection against arbitrary and 
irrational governmental deprivation, an actual property owner, a 
fortiori, possesses such an interest. 
11
. We do not share the dissent's legitimate concern that this 
standard "will invite land owner into any federal court to 
challenge even the most mundane and routine zoning decisions[.]"  
Dis. Op. Typescript at 7.  The standard we articulate today is 
implicit in Bello, and Bello has not over-burdened the federal 
courts by inviting meritless landowner suits.  Moreover, we note 
by way of analogy that persons denied licenses required for the 
practice of certain occupations are not required to demonstrate 
entitlement to the license sought in order to state a substantive 
due process claim.  To state a substantive due process claim, 
such persons need only assert that the license sought was 
arbitrarily denied.  See RRI Realty Corp., 870 F.2d at 917-18 n.4 
(citing Wilkerson v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1983)).  
This rule has not invited abuse of the federal courts by persons 
denied licenses to pursue particular occupations. 
  
had presented evidence from which a fact-finder could reasonably 
conclude that certain council members, for partisan political or 
personal reasons, improperly interfered with the process by which 
the municipality issued building permits.  Bello, 840 F.2d at 
1129-130.  DeBlasio has made allegations that, if proven, would 
establish a similar violation of his right to be free from 
arbitrary and capricious government action affecting his interest 
in use and enjoyment of property.  The question is whether 
DeBlasio has come forward with enough evidence in support of 
those allegations to survive a motion for summary judgment. 
 The district court did not think so.  The court 
down-played the significance of Werner Hoff, Sr.'s 1988 
unscheduled encounter with Holmes, stating: 
 The only possible "illegal conduct" which 
plaintiff might be referring to appears in 
Holmes's affidavit and recites that Hoff 
participated in the hearings in light of the 
five-minute conversation which took place 
between the two individuals.  This evidence 
is not sufficient to enable a jury to 
establish bias, bad faith, improper motive, 
racial animus, or the existence of partisan 
political or personal reasons and, therefore, 
to return a verdict in plaintiff's favor. 
(Appendix at 309). 
 We disagree with the district court.  We conclude that 
a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved to determine 
whether or not Werner Hoff, for personal reasons, improperly 
interfered with the process by which the Township of Amwell 
rendered zoning decisions, and that summary judgment should not 
have been entered in favor of the defendants.  Werner Hoff had 
  
decided to abstain from participating in the ZBA hearings in May 
or June of 1990.  By September, however, he believed that his 
apparent conflict had been resolved.  We do not understand why he 
believed this to be so.  One of his sons still owned the West 
Amwell property, and the property remained unoccupied.  In fact, 
Werner Hoff, Sr. continued to hold a mortgage on it.  On the 
other hand, and contrary to DeBlasio's assertions, the record 
does not show that Hoff ever "pressured" Holmes to abandon the 
DeBlasio property in favor of his own.  Still, Werner Hoff did 
state, both to Holmes and later to Venettone, that he believed 
his family's property would be a good place for Holmes' business.  
In addition, in his conversation with Holmes, Hoff specifically 
mentioned that one advantage of the Hoff property was its more 
favorable zoning status. 
 Hoff never approached Holmes after 1988, and the ZBA 
hearings did not begin until May of 1991.  Additionally, even if 
Holmes were forced to leave the DeBlasio property, he never 
indicated that he would want to relocate on Hoff's land.  To the 
contrary, in his conversation with Hoff, Holmes stated that he 
was not interested in the Hoff property, because the Quonset hut 
was not large enough to suit his needs.  We conclude, 
nonetheless, that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to 
whether the ZBA's decisions were, in some part, influenced by 
Werner Hoff, Sr.'s personal, financial interest in the resolution 
of DeBlasio's zoning problems.  Under Bello, DeBlasio thus 
presented sufficient evidence to withstand the defendants' motion 
  
for summary judgment in relation to DeBlasio's substantive due 
process claim.12 
 IV. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in relation to 
DeBlasio's substantive due process claim and New Jersey tort 
claims against the ZBA defendants and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  We will affirm the district 
court's dismissal of DeBlasio's procedural due process claim, 
claim for taking of property without just compensation, section 
1985(3) claim, commerce clause claim, and state tort claims 
against the Lavans.  We will also affirm the district court's 
denial of DeBlasio's motion for leave to file an amended 
complaint, as well as the district court's affirmance of the 
magistrate judge's discovery order. 
                     
12
. In Count III of his complaint, DeBlasio stated claims under 
New jersey tort law for intentional interference with contractual 
relations and economic opportunity.  The district court granted 
summary judgment on those claims in favor of the ZBA defendants 
because DeBlasio failed to comply with the notice provisions of 
the New Jersey Tort Claims Act ("NJTCA").  Because DeBlasio has 
asserted intentional tort claims, the notice provisions of the 
NJTCA do not apply and it was error for the district court to 
apply them.  See Fuchilla v. Layman, 210 N.J.Super. 574 
(N.J.Super. A.D. 1986). 
 
 Although it offered no explanation for having done so, the 
district court also appears to have granted summary judgment in 
favor of the Lavans in relation to DeBlasio's tort claim against 
them.  We will affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the Lavans as there is no evidence to 
support DeBlasio's tort claim against them. 
McKELVIE, District Judge (sitting by designation), dissenting. 
 I agree with the majority that this court should affirm 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants with respect to DeBlasio’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 procedural 
due process claim, unlawful taking claim, § 1985(3) claim, 
commerce clause claim, and state tort claims against the Lavans.  
I further agree that we should reverse the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the ZBA defendants with respect to the New 
Jersey tort claims.  However, because I believe this court should 
affirm the grant of summary judgment as to DeBlasio’s substantive 
due process claim, I must dissent from parts III.B & C of the 
majority’s opinion. 
I. Introduction and Factual Background 
 DeBlasio claims the ZBA defendants violated his rights 
to substantive due process in determining that his property was 
not in compliance with the West Amwell zoning ordinances and in 
denying his application for a use variance.  I agree with the 
majority that this case raises important questions about what 
property interests substantive due process will protect and that 
searching for the proper standard is a complicated matter.  The 
majority correctly determines that in order to establish a 
violation of substantive due process, a plaintiff such as 
DeBlasio must demonstrate that he possesses a property interest 
worthy of substantive due process protection.  However, I believe 
the majority’s next conclusion, that a plaintiff need only be a 
property owner to raise a substantive due process violation, is 
unwarranted and unwise.  This standard opens the doors to the 
  
federal courts far wider than the Constitution contemplates, and 
surely will require the federal courts to sit as “zoning boards 
of appeals.”  See RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of 
Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 918 (2d Cir. 1989).  Furthermore, even 
under the majority’s definition of what constitutes a sufficient 
property interest, I believe DeBlasio has failed to demonstrate 
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and thus, the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment must be affirmed.  
 The facts of this case are simple and straightforward.  
Indeed, the parties do not disagree as to the following central 
facts.  This case begins with the only two quonset huts existing 
in West Amwell Township, each located on a different piece of 
property.  Plaintiff is the owner of one of these pieces of 
property, which he began renting in 1979 to Peter Holmes for his 
lead acid battery distribution business.13  The other parcel of 
land is owned by the son of defendant Werner Hoff, a member of 
the ZBA.  On February 8, 1989, Zoning Officer Venettone issued a 
first notice to DeBlasio that his property was in violation of 
West Amwell zoning ordinances.  At around the same time, Hoff 
encountered Holmes in a diner and suggested that Holmes consider 
renting Hoff’s son’s quonset hut property.  Holmes told Hoff that 
he was not interested because the hut was too small for his use.  
                     
13
. I would note that the record is devoid of any explanation as 
to why it is pertinent that the structure on each piece of 
property is a quonset hut, or why it was crucial that Holmes’s 
business be located in a quonset hut.  
  
On June 26, 1990, the ZBA conducted a hearing on DeBlasio’s first 
notice of violation, and decided that since Venettone’s letter to 
DeBlasio failed to specifically identify the zoning ordinance 
violated, it was therefore inappropriate to make a determination 
on the violation.  Some time after this hearing, Venettone called 
Hoff concerning zoning business, at which time they discussed the 
DeBlasio matter and Hoff gave Venettone his opinion that 
DeBlasio’s property was in violation of the zoning laws.  On 
August 7, 1990, Venettone issued a second notice of violation to 
DeBlasio, stating that his use of the property was an expansion 
of a pre-existing, nonconforming use exception to the zoning 
ordinances.  DeBlasio appealed the decision and applied for a use 
variance.  On October 23, 1990, the ZBA voted to uphold 
Venettone’s determination of noncompliance.  In addition, on May 
28, 1991, the ZBA adopted a motion to deny DeBlasio’s application 
for a variance, and on June 25, 1991, they adopted a resolution 
memorializing that decision.   
 Thus, the parties are not in dispute as to the events 
that occurred leading up to the ZBA’s determination that 
DeBlasio’s property was in violation of West Amwell’s zoning 
ordinances and its decision to deny DeBlasio a use variance.  The 
only dispute, therefore, is as to what inferences may reasonably 
be drawn from those facts.  The district court determined that, 
after the close of lengthy discovery, DeBlasio failed to offer 
evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to draw the 
  
inference that the ZBA’s zoning decisions were based on bias, 
improper motive, or some other unlawful criteria.  As such, the 
case was ripe for the grant of a summary judgment.  However, the 
majority disagrees, concluding that “a genuine issue of material 
fact must be resolved to determine whether or not Werner Hoff, 
for personal reasons, improperly interfered with the process by 
which the Township of Amwell rendered zoning decisions.”  Slip 
op. at 25. 
II. DeBlasio’s Property Interest 
 The majority correctly begins its analysis with the 
property interest DeBlasio must possess in order to make out a 
claim under substantive due process, and focuses on Bello v. 
Walker, 840 F.2d 1124 (3d Cir. 1988).  In Bello, we did not 
discuss whether the plaintiffs possessed a requisite property 
interest; however, we examined the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment assuming that plaintiffs had a sufficient 
property interest in obtaining a municipal building permit.  
Thus, the majority notes that one can read Bello as requiring a 
plaintiff to possess “a particular quality of property interest” 
before he or she may bring a claim for a substantive due process 
violation.  This court recently reaffirmed this position in 
Acierno, holding that a plaintiff “complaining of a violation of 
substantive due process rights . . . must prove that the 
governmental authority acted to ‘infringe[] a property interest 
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment.’”  Acierno v. Cloutier, 
  
40 F.3d 597, 616 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Midnight Sessions, Ltd. 
v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 679 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1668 (1992)); see also Reich v. Beharry, 883 
F.2d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding plaintiff “possesses no 
property interest that entitles him to substantive due process 
protection”). 
 The majority falters, however, when it turns to the 
determination of exactly what property interests will qualify for 
substantive due process protection.  The majority finds “it 
consistent with Bello” to hold that mere ownership is “a property 
interest worthy of substantive due process protection.”  Slip op. 
at 22.  Thus, in order to establish a violation of substantive 
due process, a plaintiff need only allege that a decision 
limiting the use of land he or she owns was “arbitrarily or 
irrationally reached.”  I believe this rule of law is incorrect 
for two reasons.     
 First, I believe that the majority’s standard 
represents a departure from the legal precedent of the Supreme 
Court and of this Circuit.  The majority relies on Bello and 
Neiderhiser v. Borough of Berwick, 840 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1988), 
to support its conclusions.  However, I do not read Bello to 
stand for the proposition that mere ownership is a sufficient 
substantive due process property interest.  As stated above, the 
property interest at issue in Bello was the apparent right to a 
municipal building permit.  Similarly, Neiderhiser does not 
  
support such a broad standard.  In Neiderhiser, as in Bello, we 
skipped the necessary determination of what property interest 
plaintiffs possessed.  However, in that case, the plaintiffs were 
lessors who asserted a right to a special zoning exemption “based 
on the fact that the property had been operated on a commercial 
basis for the past 30 years and that the proposed use was 
consistent with prior non-conforming . . . use.”  Neiderhiser, 
840 F.2d at 214.  Thus, it was this interest in the right to a 
zoning exemption which we assumed was sufficient to allege a 
viable due process violation. 
 To answer the question of what “particular qualities” 
of property interests are protected by substantive due process, I 
believe our analysis is dictated by our recent decision in 
Acierno, which follows the Supreme Court’s teachings in Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).  In Acierno, we adopted the 
Court’s position that property interests are not created by the 
Constitution, but instead “stem from an independent source such 
as state law--rules or understandings that secure certain 
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those 
benefits.”  Acierno, 40 F.3d at 616 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 
577).  In so doing, we held that “when analyzing substantive due 
process claims courts are required to turn to state and local law 
to determine whether the plaintiff possessed a property interest 
which was abrogated by the governmental action.”  Id. 
  
 In Roth, the Supreme Court focused its definition of a 
property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment on “what is 
sought.”  RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of 
Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 915 (2d Cir. 1989).  In its test, the 
Court rejected the supposition that a property interest in a 
certain benefit could stem from a mere “abstract need or desire 
for it” or “unilateral expectation of it.”  Instead, there must 
be a “legitimate claim of entitlement.”  Roth, 408 U.S. at 576; 
accord RRI, 870 F.2d at 915.  As we recognized in Acierno, this 
claim of entitlement must be found in state law.   
 In footnote 9 of its opinion, the majority displays its 
uncertainty that Roth’s “legitimate claim of entitlement 
approach” is mandated by the Supreme Court, restating its belief 
that the Court has “yet to articulate a standard for determining 
which state-created property interests merit substantive due 
process protection.”  Slip op. at 22.  Whether or not the Roth 
approach is required by the Supreme Court, it would appear that 
this court has already indicated its approval of the “claim of 
entitlement” standard by holding in Acierno that property 
interests are created by “rules and understandings that secure 
certain benefits and support claims of entitlement to those 
benefits.”  Acierno, 40 F.3d at 616 (emphasis added). 
 In addition, the “claim of entitlement” standard should 
be applied in this case not only because it follows from the 
Supreme Court’s and Third Circuit’s prior jurisprudence, but also 
  
because it represents the approach to substantive due process 
zoning cases adopted by many other circuits as well.  See Gardner 
v. Baltimore Mayor and City Council, 969 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 
1992) (holding that existence of a property interest turns on 
whether there is a “legitimate claim of entitlement” under state 
law); Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(same); RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 
870 F.2d 911, 917 (2d Cir. 1989) (same);  Carolan v. City of 
Kansas City, 813 F.2d 178, 181 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); Yale Auto 
Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1985) (same).  
 Second, and perhaps equally as important, I believe the 
majority's new standard of “mere ownership” is erroneous because 
essentially it is tantamount to no standard at all.  It is 
difficult to imagine that a plaintiff would argue his or her 
substantive due process rights had been violated as to property 
he or she did not even own (or at least possess a significant 
financial interest in).  The majority's conclusion establishes a 
precedent whereby a plaintiff states a substantive due process 
claim merely by alleging deliberate and arbitrary abuse of 
government power.  It invites any land owner into federal court 
to challenge even the most mundane and routine zoning decisions, 
ignoring the oft-cited admonition that the role of the federal 
courts “is not and should not be to sit as a zoning board of 
appeals.”  Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 
(1974) (Marshal, J., dissenting).  As Judge Posner wrote for the 
  
Seventh Circuit:  “[I]t is tempting to view every zoning decision 
that is adverse to the landowner . . . as a deprivation of 
property. . . . [However, n]o one thinks substantive due process 
should be interpreted so broadly as to protect landowners against 
erroneous zoning decisions.”  Coniston Corp. v. Village of 
Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 465-66 (7th Cir. 1988).  
 I believe the majority misunderstands the concern I 
have articulated above when it states in footnote 11 that “Bello 
has not over-burdened the federal courts by inviting meritless 
landowner suits.”  Slip op. at 24.  My objection to the 
challenges to routine zoning decisions that could be brought, 
under the majority’s standard, by anyone who owns land is not 
that the courts will now be flooded by claims that are meritless 
per se.  It is, rather, that claims brought under this standard 
do not raise the issues of constitutional significance 
appropriately addressed by the federal courts.  As the First 
Circuit has consistently held, “the due process clause may not 
ordinarily be used to involve federal courts in the rights and 
wrongs of local planning disputes.  In the vast majority of 
instances, local and state agencies and courts are closer to the 
situation and better equipped to provide relief.”  Nestor Colon 
Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 45 (1st Cir. 
1992).  Every zoning decision seemingly “impinges upon a 
landowner’s use and enjoyment of property.”  See slip. op. at 23.  
Thus, confining the category of property interests a plaintiff 
  
must possess simply to ownership subjects every zoning decision 
to potential federal review.   
 I believe, as Judge Posner wrote in Coniston, 
“[p]roperty is not a thing, but a bundle of rights.”  844 F.2d at 
465.  Hence, we must look to what particular rights and uses a 
person is entitled by the state through the ownership of a parcel 
of land in order to determine whether he or she possesses a 
property interest that merits due process protection.  While I 
can appreciate the majority's frustration at the perceived lack 
of guidance in its search for what constitutes such a sufficient 
property interest, the difficulty of the task does not grant us 
license to set the threshold so low as to eradicate all utility 
it was intended to possess. 
 With that preface, I now turn to the evaluation of 
DeBlasio’s claims.  DeBlasio alleges his substantive due process 
rights were violated by two actions of the ZBA--the affirmance of 
Venettone’s determination that DeBlasio's property was not in 
compliance with a previously granted exception to the West Amwell 
zoning code and the denial of DeBlasio’s application for a use 
variance.  The first step in analyzing DeBlasio’s claims is to 
determine whether he possesses a property interest that is 
cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Gardner, 969 F.2d 
at 68.  In order to make this determination, we must look to what 
“claims of entitlement” can be found in state law.   
  
 DeBlasio’s claims raise two possible property 
interests:  his right to the continued nonconforming use of his 
property and his right to obtain a use variance.  As to the 
first, the question of whether a claim of entitlement exists 
“should depend on whether, absent the alleged denial of due 
process, there is either a certainty or a very strong likelihood” 
that DeBlasio’s property would have been found to comply with the 
pre-existing, nonconforming use exception granted to the first 
owner.  See Yale Auto Parts, 758 F.2d at 59.  It is true that 
under the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Act, “[a]ny nonconforming 
use or structure existing at the time of the passage of an 
ordinance may be continued.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55D-68 (1991).  
However, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized the general 
policy in the law to restrict and disfavor a nonconforming use:  
“Because nonconforming uses are inconsistent with the objectives 
of uniform zoning, the courts have required that consistent with 
the property rights of those affected and with substantial 
justice, they should be reduced to conformity as quickly as is 
compatible with justice.”  Town of Belleville v. Parrillo’s, 
Inc., 416 A.2d 388, 391 (N.J. 1980).  Thus, an existing 
nonconforming use may not be enlarged or changed as of right and 
will be allowed to persist only “if it is a continuance of 
substantially the same kind of use as that to which the premises 
were devoted at the time of the passage of the zoning ordinance.”  
Id.  Furthermore, “[w]here there is doubt as to the 
  
substantiality of the extension, it should be disapproved.”  
Hartman v. Township of Randolph, 155 A.2d 554, 558 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1959).   
 The previous owners of DeBlasio's property were 
operating a one-man automobile repair shop when West Amwell 
adopted its first zoning ordinance, and it was this use that was 
permitted to continue as a pre-existing nonconforming exception 
to the zoning restrictions.  Holmes’s interstate battery 
distributorship clearly represents a departure from this prior 
use, and there would appear to be some doubt as to whether this 
battery business is “substantially the same kind of use” as the 
previous single person car repair shop.  Thus it cannot be said 
that there is a “certainty or a very strong likelihood” that 
DeBlasio would have been permitted to continue the present use of 
his property indefinitely, and that he would never have been 
deemed to have expanded the pre-existing nonconforming use 
exception granted to the prior owners.  Consequently, DeBlasio 
possesses no claim of entitlement under state law to the 
continued nonconforming use of his property, and thus does not 
possess this first category of property interest which he 
asserts.  
 As to the second possible property interest, that is, 
whether DeBlasio had a right to approval of his application for a 
use variance, many courts have held that “whether a property-
holder possesses a legitimate claim of entitlement to a permit or 
  
approval turns on whether, under state and municipal law, the 
local agency lacks all discretion to deny issuance of the permit 
or approval.  Any significant discretion conferred upon the local 
agency defeats the claim of a property interest.”  Gardner, 969 
F.2d at 68; accord New Burnham Prairie Homes v. Village of 
Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1480 (7th Cir. 1990); Spence, 873 F.2d at 
258; RRI, 870 F.2d at 918; Carolan, 813 F.2d at 181; Michigan 
Environmental Resources Associates, Inc. v. City of Macomb, 669 
F. Supp. 158, 160 (E.D. Mich. 1987).  Thus, a cognizable property 
interest exists “only when the discretion of the issuing agency 
is so narrowly circumscribed that approval of a proper 
application is virtually assured.”  RRI, 870 F.2d at 918.  This 
standard “balances the need for local autonomy in a matter of 
paramount local concern” (such as zoning regulations) with the 
need for constitutional protection from governmental abuses of 
power.  See Gardner, 969 F.2d at 69.   
 New Jersey zoning law authorizes a zoning board of 
adjustment to grant a variance in “particular cases and for 
special reasons” to permit “(1) a use or principal structure in a 
district restricted against such use or principal structure, [or] 
(2) an expansion of a nonconforming use.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
40:55D-70(d).  However, no variance may be granted unless it can 
be done “without substantial detriment to the public good and 
will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the 
zone plan and zoning ordinance.”  Id.  These provisions include 
  
no mandatory language but instead appear to create a flexible 
standard which assigns boards of adjustment the power to grant a 
variance in special cases at their discretion.  Moreover, the New 
Jersey courts have recognized that the legislature “has vested 
discretionary authority in boards of adjustment to grant or deny 
variance applications.”  Eagle Group v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
644 A.2d 1115, 1120 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).  It 
follows, then, that state law has given DeBlasio no claim of 
entitlement to a use variance, and thus no property interest in 
the approval of his application. 
 Therefore, since DeBlasio has failed to demonstrate he 
possesses any property interests cognizable under the Fourteenth 
Amendment that could have been abrogated by the ZBA, the district 
court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants on this issue, and I believe this court should affirm 
that decision.  
III. Evidence of Personal Bias or Improper Motive 
 After determining that “a land-owning plaintiff” who 
alleges that any governmental decision affecting the use of his 
or her land was arbitrarily or irrationally reached has, “as a 
matter of law, impliedly established possession of a property 
interest worthy of substantive due process protection,” the 
majority goes on to examine “whether DeBlasio has come forward 
with enough evidence in support of [his] allegations to survive a 
motion for summary judgment.”  Slip op. at 23-25.  Even if I were 
  
to adopt the majority’s position that mere ownership constitutes 
a property interest sufficient to invoke constitutional 
protection, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that 
DeBlasio has presented sufficient evidence from which a fact-
finder could reasonably conclude that the government action was 
taken based on improper motives or unlawful criteria. 
 The Supreme Court has stated, “the mere existence of 
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat 
an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the 
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).  A 
genuine issue of material fact arises only if a reasonable jury 
could find for the nonmoving party on that fact.  Id. at 248.  
The nonmovant is not given the benefit of every inference or 
possibility, but only of every reasonable inference.  Spence, 873 
F.2d at 257.  The nonmoving party must offer sufficient evidence 
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of 
that party.  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.  “If the evidence is 
merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary 
judgment may be granted.”  Id. at 250-51 (citations omitted).  
 After convincing the court he possesses a cognizable 
property interest, DeBlasio must demonstrate he was the victim of 
arbitrary and capricious government action in order to establish 
that his substantive due process rights were violated.  The 
district court correctly recognized that this determination turns 
  
on whether the actions taken by the ZBA against DeBlasio were 
based on unlawful criteria such as personal bias, bad faith, or 
improper motive.   
 To support his allegations of personal bias and 
improper motive, DeBlasio appears to allege the following facts: 
1) At some point in early 1989, Hoff encountered Holmes in a 
diner and suggested that Holmes consider renting Hoff’s son’s 
quonset hut property.  During the conversation, Hoff noted that 
the zoning regulations were more beneficial for his business.  
However, Holmes told Hoff that he was not interested because the 
hut was too small for his use.  2) Some time after June 26, 1990, 
Venettone called Hoff concerning zoning business, at which time 
they discussed the DeBlasio matter and Hoff gave Venettone his 
opinion that DeBlasio’s property was in violation of the zoning 
laws.  3) Hoff participated in the 1990-91 zoning hearings 
regarding DeBlasio’s property.  As I stated above, defendants do 
not dispute that these events occurred.  The district court found 
that this evidence was insufficient to enable a reasonable jury 
to find bias or improper motive, and thus to return a verdict in 
DeBlasio’s favor, and I agree.  
 As the majority recognized, “the record does not show 
that Hoff ever ‘pressured’ Holmes to abandon the DeBlasio 
property in favor of his [son’s].”  Slip op. at 25-26.  He had no 
contact with Holmes regarding this suggestion after early 1989.  
It is also undisputed that Holmes believed the other quonset hut 
  
property was inadequate for his business, and there is no 
evidence to suggest that Holmes would have relocated to that 
property.  Furthermore, Venettone’s own testimony shows that he 
called Hoff in his capacity as secretary of the board of 
adjustment and broached the subject of the DeBlasio zoning matter 
to get information about it.  None of the above evidence is 
sufficient to support the inference that Hoff’s actions as a 
member of the ZBA were influenced by personal bias or improper 
motive; no reasonable jury could draw this inference, as it would 
be based solely on mere speculation.   
 DeBlasio also contends that Hoff’s involvement in the 
hearings reveals a conspiracy on the part of the ZBA to violate 
his substantive due process rights.  However, DeBlasio has 
provided insufficient evidence to support this theory.  It would 
appear that discovery in this case lasted for twelve months, and 
yet DeBlasio has been unable to present any facts to demonstrate 
the existence of a conspiracy.  While the district court 
prohibited DeBlasio from deposing the members of the ZBA as to 
the mental thought processes they employed in reaching the 
decision to deny a use variance, DeBlasio remained free to 
inquire into ex parte meetings, off-the-record communications, or 
discussions between Hoff and other ZBA members, or other 
manifestations of personal animus, and to probe for documentary 
evidence of such events.  But after the close of lengthy 
discovery, DeBlasio has come forward with no evidence of any 
  
discussions, arrangements, promises, or agreements between Hoff 
and the other ZBA members to vote against DeBlasio.  Furthermore, 
he has not identified a single occasion of contact between Hoff 
and any board member that would suggest improper conduct.  
Similarly, DeBlasio has supplied no evidence that would show Hoff 
was retaliating against Holmes because he did not wish to move to 
Hoff’s son’s property.  Thus, no reasonable jury could find that 
a conspiracy existed within the ZBA to deprive DeBlasio of 
substantive due process. 
 Finally, DeBlasio has failed to offer any facts to show 
a causal link between Hoff’s alleged personal bias and membership 
on the zoning board and the decisions affecting DeBlasio’s 
property.  First, the ZBA’s vote to affirm Venettone’s 
determination that DeBlasio’s property was an expansion of the 
pre-existing nonconforming use exception was unanimous.  Second, 
the vote to deny the application for a variance was four to 
three, with Hoff voting against.  However, the grant of a 
variance requires five votes by law.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. 40:55D-
70(d).  Even if Hoff did not participate in the vote, DeBlasio 
would have garnered only three votes in support of the variance, 
still rendering his application unsuccessful.  Again, no 
reasonable jury could find that the ZBA’s decisions were based on 
unlawful criteria.  DeBlasio simply has been unable to provide 
evidence that would support his allegations.  Because DeBlasio 
has, after adequate time for discovery, failed to make a showing 
  
sufficient to establish essential elements of his case, upon 
which he will bear the burden of proof, I would affirm the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment.  See Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).   
IV. Conclusion 
 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the ZBA defendants on DeBlasio's substantive due process claim.  
The majority reverses this decision, finding that DeBlasio has 
offered sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment.  In so 
doing, the majority holds that mere ownership is a sufficient 
property interest worthy of substantive due process protection.  
I disagree with that conclusion, and furthermore would affirm the 
grant of summary judgment as DeBlasio has failed to demonstrate 
he possesses a property interest cognizable under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  However, even under the majority’s conclusion as to 
the requisite level of property interest, I would affirm summary 
judgment, as I believe DeBlasio has failed to present evidence 
that would permit a reasonable jury to find the ZBA’s zoning 
decisions with regard to DeBlasio were based on personal bias, 
improper motive, or some other unlawful criteria.   
 I respectfully dissent. 
